

10th July 1942

Housing Problems of Toronto 1942, by E. G. Faludi

Part I: Temporary or Permanent Housing? 10 July 1942

Part II: Permanent Housing and Public Housing. 25 July 1942

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Comments on the "Report on Housing for the
City of Toronto" submitted to the Board of
Control by Lewis Duncan, Esq., M.C., K.C.,
Vice-Chairman.-

By Dr. E. G. Faludi

1. Part: Temporary or Permanent Housing?

10th July 1942.

Comments on the "Report on Housing for the City of Toronto" submitted to the Board of Control by LEWIS DUNCAN, Esq., M.C., K.C., Vice-Chairman. -

The constructively detailed report by Mr. Duncan makes it clear that the Housing problem of Toronto is no longer a purely academic subject, but has rather taken its place among the foremost issues of the day. By surveys, figures and statistics of all kinds it has been shown the existence of the need for housing and it has also been indicated the solutions for it. They are preventive and curative. While the preventive solutions are concerned with the housing problems of the future, the curative solutions are dealing with the immediate needs.

Immediate problems:

The housing shortage of Toronto today has two aspects: 1.) related to the war effort arising out of the greatly expanded war industries in particular localities.

2.) related to the normal development of the City, arising out of the lack of adequate residential building during the past decade and of the continuous obsolescence of the existent buildings.

Immediate needs:

The report of the Commissioner of Buildings and Mr. Palmer Kent, K.C. (23 April 1942) states that; "there is a need of approximately 2,000 new dwelling units annually, but in the year 1941 only 555 units were produced".

Emergency Solutions proposed:

To relieve the immediate needs it is suggested in the report submitted by Vice-Chairman Duncan; the immediate building of 2,000 dwelling units divided in two groups a.) 1,000 wartime (temporary) demountable houses (prefabricated) supplied by the W. H. Ltd., to be built partly on land owned by the City or the Harbour Board and partly in the vicinity of the war defense factories. b.) 1,000 permanent dwelling units, to be built partly by private enterprise and partly by Toronto Housing Commission. These latter should be available at reasonable prices for the returning service men, workers, persons with low income, etc.

War Defense Housing:

It is perfectly obvious that the suggested building of 2,000 dwelling units will not solve the general housing problem of Toronto; when the yearly need only calls for the addition of 2,000 units. Nevertheless the proposed building of 1,000 units for the war industry workers will at least contribute to the war effort, which today is more important than anything else.

The urgent need for housing of the war defense workers asks for urgent solutions and because of the nature of the problem it could be solved only by the government through its agency the Wartime Housing Limited.

General policy of Wartime Housing Ltd.:

Speed, economy and movability are the three guiding principles in the production and erection of housing for the war industry workers. To satisfy these requirements the Wartime Housing Ltd. erects demountable prefabricated houses, which could be demobilized after the war, from those areas, where the war industries will be left without orders and will be forced to drop the workers it had to employ.

These demobilized houses are supposed to be salvaged and redistributed to the points, where they will be most needed.

The economic policy of the Wartime Housing Ltd. demands for the greatest possible salvage value, therefore the structure of those houses supposed to be durable and sound and of high insulating properties.

Toronto needs a different policy:

While the experience of Wartime Housing Ltd. in most of the cases called for temporary houses, but temporary not with regard to their durability but their location, Toronto needs a much different solution.

Most of the war industries in the Toronto area, either metropolitan or suburb, (greater Toronto) are planned, built and organized for peace purposes also. This is strongly justified and could be easily realized by the latest surveys of the industrial development of the City. It is obvious therefore that there is no reason to build for a permanent need, temporary housing, which asks for relatively higher construction, maintenance and management costs and which will easily develop in a few years into slums and will increase blighted areas.

Effect of temporary Housing:

Considering the acute and the continuously growing housing shortage of Toronto (which will greatly increase after the war by the demand of the returning soldiers and of the shift of industrial workers from smaller towns and cities, where warwork is ceased), it is also obvious that from social and economical point of view no public authority will dare to demolish any thing, which could be used as shelter, until necessary replacement is not provided. From figures given in the report of Controller Duncan and the production capacity of the local building industries it is not difficult to forecast that this replacement cannot be provided until many years after the war. On the other hand, we should never forget that the worst slum today was once a new house. So every house built today may become part of the slums of tomorrow, in poorly planned, temporary surrounding and neighbourhood.

Most of the slum areas have been purely a result of neglect and this danger is even greater where people know that their conditions are temporary. The Wartime Housing Ltd. has some experience in this field.

Permanent Housing and prefabricated houses:

The question arises now, would it be possible to erect permanent housing with the building method used by the Wartime Housing Ltd.?

From the structural point of view the houses erected by the Wartime Housing Ltd. are durable and sound and well insulated. The structure is built on the same principle as the usual frame construction tolerated by the By-laws if built outside of the city limits. The use of prefabricated houses was lately even encouraged by National Housing Authority under the National Housing Act. No basement and no permanent foundation is used by the Wartime Housing Ltd. for temporary housing, but this could be easily prepared while the house units are manufactured in the factory. But it is neither the structure, nor the time factor, but the economic factor which apparently prohibits the erection of those houses in a permanent way.

Planning against Depreciation and Deterioration:

Under the erection of housing in a permanent way, we understand the placement of dwellings and other buildings on the ground for permanent purposes, their relationship to each other, to open spaces for sunlight and fresh air, to open spaces for recreation and amenity to the roads or streets which

give access to the buildings, and to those surface and subsurface utilities which afford the buildings the services of water, sewerage, light and power, the selection of the land and its relation to its immediate environment.

It is no longer the question of planning "just a group of houses", but the planning of a neighbourhood with the insurance against deterioration and to improve the health, happiness, and social usefulness of the people in the community. Rosedale is a good example of the deterioration of neighbourhood planned as an exclusive residential estate and not as a living community for a cross section of all the population.

**Planning for
Wartime
Housing:**

The usual policy of the Wartime Housing Ltd. in planning a temporary housing scheme is: (see "Site planning for Wartime Housing; by W. L. Somerville, F.R.A. IC. vice-president of Wartime Housing Ltd. Journal, R.A.I.C., June 1942). "...to lease land with public utilities, streets, etc., all ready and available for immediate building. In many cases land owned by municipality, fulfilling these requirements has been secured for mere token rental. In such cases existing street layouts must be accepted, and the only opportunity afforded the site planner is subdivision for the house sites within the street boundaries".

"....Where it is necessary to construct sewers, water supply and streets, is the policy of the Company to purchase the land. By doing so there is a better opportunity for salvaging the capital invested in the public services by sale of the improved land at some future time."

"....It has not been necessary, so far, for Wartime Housing Ltd. to undertake the building of an entirely new community. Very few developments exceed two or three hundred houses except in the larger cities, where schools, shopping centers and other amenities are usually available. The sites are selected to avoid the necessity of the additional expenditures that would be required if these had to be provided"....

**Location of
land for De-
Fense Hous-
ing:**

From the figures given by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics it is very easy to assume that the continuously increasing population of Toronto will need new and new areas to live in and the map of Toronto shows us clearly that these areas tend to extend mostly in the direction or neighbourhood of the industries now devoted to the production of war materials, but with

no doubt to be converted into means of producing peace time materials.

The land suitable and available therefore, for a housing scheme of 1,000 or 500 units is without public services and streets. Therefore the Wartime Housing Ltd. will have to face a completely new problem.

Financial Problems:

It is obvious that before we decide the type of housing temporary or permanent, a careful study and analysis of all the cost, rental and salvaging factors must be made. Assuming a temporary housing scheme built in the usual way, on land to be developed by the Wartime Housing Ltd: the factors to be considered are the following:-

- a) Land, development and improvements.
- b) Materials
- c) Equipment (plumbing fixtures and heating equipment)
- d) Labor
- e) Overhead
- f) Fees, (architects, engineers, other technical or specialized advisers).
- g) Operating and maintenance expenses.
- h) Insurance rates.

Any business man will realize at once that however low the a, b, c, d, e, and f factors are, because of the uncertain short life limit of the scheme and temporary character of the living conditions, the operating and maintenance expenses will absorb nearly all the rent incomes. Therefore no fair return on the investment could be expected in this way.

It is clear also that in case of demobilization of the assumed temporary housing scheme only from a, b, and c items can be expected salvage values, of a very small part of the invested capital.

In the large scale housing production the total cost is divided as follows:

a) Land, development, improvements	15%
b) Fees	5%
c) Materials	30%
d) Equipment	10%
e) Labor	20%
f) Overhead and incidentals	<u>20%</u>
Total	100%

How much will the Wartime Housing Ltd. save from these expenses and how much will be salvaged from the houses, when they will be demobilized, transported and re-erected to the points where they will be needed after the war? Assuming an optimistic conception of the duration of the war and the use of the houses for only 3 years, the aspect of the probable saving and salvaging will be as follows:

a) Land, development, improvements: It is very probable that the poorly planned temporary neighbourhood will not be able to maintain its cost value, and because of its depreciating and disintegrating character it will depreciate the value of the building lands in its surroundings also. Therefore we should consider a loss of at least 25% of its nominal cost. Related to the above mentioned figures it means 3.7% loss.

b) Fees: nothing can be saved.

c) Materials: However perfect and careful will be the maintenance of the houses in the assumed three years of use, the exterior covering of the walls and roof will depreciate and by demobilizing, storing, re-assembling at least one third of all the materials will have to be replaced. Related to the total cost figures this means a loss of 10%.

d) Equipment

e) Labor

f) Overhead and incidentals because of their characteristics it should be considered a loss even during the building process. The total loss could be illustrated in the following table:

	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Loss</u>	<u>Saving</u>
a) Land, develop. improv.	15%	3.7%	11.3%
b) Fees	5%	5%	
c) Materials	30%	10%	20%
d) Equipment	10%	10%	
e) Labor	20%	20%	
f) Overhead, incidentals	<u>20%</u>	<u>20%</u>	
Total	100%	68.7%	31.3%

The probable loss of 68.7% of the total investment is an optimistic figure, when we have to consider, that in case of re-assembling of these houses the Government will have to invest new capital for rehabilitation, storage, transport, assembling, fees, equipment, and overhead.

It is a great mistake and completely wrong conception of many people to believe that prefabricated house or any other type of house, could be used and demobilized and re-assembled without a great loss and without new expenses to invest.

The main characteristic of prefabrication is the speed and low cost in mass production, but once a house is assembled and placed on the ground, and connected with public utilities its value and properties should be considered at the same rate as houses built in the traditional way. A house cannot be compared with a car, because its function is not the same.

The walls, roof and floor in a house conform only 23% of the total cost. In no case, not even of a prefabricated house, can be saved the total cost.

In consideration of the economic point of view it is evident, that it would be a great failure to build temporary housing, when with a little more investment we could build better housing for the future needs also, and instead of an economic and social loss, the government could regain the invested capital and use it again for new housing.

Advantages of permanent housing:

Let us now consider the advantages of permanent housing and its financial aspect with the use of prefabricated houses supplied by Wartime Housing Ltd.

Permanent housing means to build not only to meet the present critical situation, but for peace, permanency and for higher standards.

Toronto faces a huge task in the field of housing and if it should be successful it would show an invaluable example to the government, to the private industry, which would have a profound effect upon the future housing policy of the whole country.

It would be the first attempt in Canada in public housing, to provide housing for those low income families for whom private initiative has been unable to build and operate. The basic program should be: to obtain a large tract of land to create a community for families of modest income, and arranged and managed so as to encourage a family and community life, but which will not involve subjecting them to coercion or theoretical discipline. The dwellings and the land upon which they are located is to be held in one ownership; preferably a municipal or other public agency which will rent or lease them but will not sell them.

Private ownership:

This seems in contradiction with the main characteristic of the people of Toronto. Only a small part of Torontonians prefer to live in rented homes. A large percentage of them wants to own homes of their own. The desire for home ownership is rooted deep in the hearts of them and the growth of the city has been based very largely upon this fundamental desire.

A home, in the minds of the people, is not merely a piece of real property. It represents a form of security having social and moral, as well as financial and physical attributes.

Public Control and private ownership:

To satisfy this desire and in the meantime to avoid the complications ordinarily due to diverse ownerships, the public authority should step out of the management after the war. By that time the residents will have accumulated through their rental credits an equity to protect both themselves and the government. The government sells or gives a long term lease of the entire property to a mutual housing company formed by residents, of the community. Originally the government will own all the stock of the company, but each acceptable tenant will purchase an amount of stock equal in value to the particular dwelling he occupies. The mutual housing company then will enter into an agreement with the tenant for the amount to be paid.

Mutual Housing Company

Supposing the government through the Wartime Housing Ltd. decides to invest for the 1,000 temporary dwelling units including land and public services, \$3,000,000; it will lose at least 60% of it, if the houses are demobilized, while with the proposed solution the entire amount will return and Toronto will have solved in the best and satisfactory way for all citizens its housing problem. Financially it should work in the following way:

The government will first hold a \$3,000,000 mortgage on the entire project. But the Mutual Housing Corporation will amortize this through monthly rental of from \$24 to \$30 by tenants. This is nearly the rental of the temporary housing projects of the Wartime Housing Ltd. The rent each tenant pays will not be a payment on his property, but on stock in a public housing corporation. What the 1,000 families will have to pay at the end of a 20 to 30 year amortization schedule will be mutual ownership of the community. The tenant must pay his way and keep his home neat. The elected trustees of Mutual Housing Corporation are empowered with authority to evict a recalcitrant tenant.

There are in Holland and Sweden and lately in the United States many Mutual Housing Corporations working successfully this way.

It is interesting to mention the psychological effect of this method. While the resident theoretically are renting and not buying, practically they own the house for a life time. Nearly all the tenants spend large sums of money in improvements; and they develop a fine community spirit. European experience shows how essential for the maintenance of a good standard of housing is the cultivation of local sense of responsibility and local interest; and how helpful may be the many local incentives which exist.

European experience also shows how stimulating is the success of the Mutual Housing Corporations on the private enterprise. Even the enemies of public housing were convinced, that they have no legitimate ground to complain against it.

CONT. DUNCAN HEADS HOUSING COMMITTEE

Suggests Study of Land in City Area for Possible Building

Controller Lewis Duncan, author of the report on Toronto housing, was elected chairman of the special housing committee set up by board of control to examine and report on the situation on Monday.

The committee is composed of Con. Duncan, E. D. Tolchard, Board of Trade; Mrs. N. C. Stephens, Local Council of Women; Professor E. R. Ashurs, City Planning Board; John Parkin, Builders' Exchange of Toronto; Alfred Ward, Toronto and District Labor Council; Wing Commander F. H. Marani, Ontario Association of Architects, and Mayor Conboy. The committee decided to hold daily meetings the rest of this week.

The controller suggested the committee adopt the following procedure:

1. Hear evidence on need for housing accommodation from the rent control office and also from persons who might appeal to the city.
2. Examine the availability of land in and out of the city; also material, labor and management available for building.
3. Look into the question of financing to discover whether private builders will require government assistance.
4. Discover the attitude of the Dominion government toward a housing scheme and also to look into the plans of the Wartime Housing commission so that the plans of the two bodies would not conflict.

Multi-Family Dwellings

Mrs. N. C. Stephens, representing the Local Council of Women, said she had noticed a large number of big houses that could be converted to multi-family dwellings. This would be cheaper than building new homes, she said.

Mayor Conboy, ex-officio member of the committee, said Ottawa had already been in touch with the city to have the restrictions which prevent these large houses being used for more than one family, lifted for the duration.

Con. Duncan stated that the setting up of an information bureau, which has already been endorsed by board of control, "comes forward as an emergency measure."

"Bound to Get Slums"

"We are bound to get slums if we attempt to make permanent dwellings out of units being erected by the wartime housing commissioner," said Mr. Parkin. "I suggest we contact the Dominion government and see if we can get the money they are willing to spend on housing in Toronto, add a little to it and build more permanent dwellings. The difference in cost would be very little and it would mean the difference between slums and attractive houses."

Mr. Parkin said he had asked Mr. Piggott of the wartime housing what would become of the temporary units at the end of the war.

"I was told he did not know what would become of them," Mr. Parkin said. "Mr. Piggott told me the houses were built to last about 10 years."

It was decided to ask the wartime housing commission to send a representative to today's committee meeting in order to describe the plans and also to see how far the commission would go toward helping to finance a more permanent type of dwelling.

"There is no question that we need more houses," declared Mr. Tolchard. "The question is how many. I suggest we find out how many dwellings we need before we approach the commission."

Re-Conditioning Plan

Mr. Parkin said he had investigated several two-and-a-half and three-storey dwellings on King St. and Spadina Ave., suitable for rehabilitation. He suggested the city condition and rent them. The committee decided to invite owners of these dwellings to discuss the plan.

The committee also decided to invite Blake Jackson, controller of construction and representatives from the Toronto real estate board and the three Toronto newspapers to today's meeting which will be held at 3 p.m.

Opposes Idea

"It is a great mistake to believe that a prefabricated house could be used and demobilized and re-assembled without a great loss," Dr. E. G. Faludi, formerly special adviser on housing, department of social science, University of Toronto, told the committee. Mr. Faludi advocated construction of permanent dwellings.

"It would be a great failure to build temporary housing, when with a little more investment we could build better housing and instead of loss, the government could regain the invested capital and use it again for new housing."

Dr. Faludi stated that the proposed building of 1,000 demountable building units and 1,000 permanent building units as recommended by Con. Duncan, "will not solve the general housing problem of Toronto." But may at least contribute to the war effort.

He suggested as a basic program, "to obtain a large tract of land to create a community for families of modest incomes, and arranged and managed so as to encourage a family and community life, but which will not involve subjecting them to coercion or theoretical discipline."

"Public authority should step out of the management after the war," he advised. "By that time the residents will have accumulated through their rental credits an equity to protect both themselves and the government. The government sells or gives long term lease of the entire property to a mutual housing company formed by residents of the community. Originally the government will own all the stock, but each acceptable tenant will purchase an amount of stock equal in value to the particular dwelling he occupies. The mutual housing company then will enter into an agreement with the tenant for the amount to be paid."

"While the residents theoretically are renting and not buying, practically they own the house for a life time. Nearly all the tenants spend large sums of money in improvements; and they develop a fine community spirit."

July 25th, 1942.

Comments on the "Report on Housing for the City of Toronto" submitted to the Board of Control by Lewis Duncan, Esq., M.C., K.C. Vice-Chairman.

2nd Part: Permanent Housing and Public Housing.

By - Dr. E. G. Faludi

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- By Dr. E. G. Faludi.

Part 2: Permanent Housing and Public Housing

Housing Surveys of the past. The lack of "adequate" housing in the City of Toronto is something that has been discussed and debated for a good many years. Unfortunately there have never been means of measuring the housing shortage in relationship to either the changing conditions of population or properties. Figures published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics referring to the census at 1931, or recently given by some Municipal Departments can only serve as rough guides and are sometimes quite misleading because of changes provoked by exceptional conditions of this war. The surveys conducted in the past by the Bruce Committee on Housing have been very valuable to determine the approximate shortage of the pre-war period but any conclusion deduced from them at present would not be up to date.

The Vacancy Index. In Controller Duncan's report the only evidence of a housing shortage is related to the vacancy index. It is worth-while to mention that the different opinions concerning the housing shortage, which are expressed by the vacancy index, present a great misunderstanding in view of the shortage. Even among the responsible citizens there exists a very definite OPINION, that nobody was found in Toronto without a roof, therefore there is no real shortage housing at present.

As to what extent the vacancy index alters the real picture of the situation is recognized by the fact that there is a considerable number of big empty homes on the market to be sold or for rent, but unfit for occupancy, because of the high maintenance cost and lack of equipment. While no real shortage in the high income class for housing exists, those empty houses cannot be occupied by the lower brackets, which really suffers from the shortage.

The recent inquiries conducted by Controller Duncan lead to the conclusion that approximately 3,500 dwelling units are required at present. c.f. (Part VI; page 29)

The causes of the shortage mentioned in the report do not disclose that a considerable number of people in the City of Toronto are living in dwellings under substandard conditions. There is no reference at all as to how many dwellings have been found to be substandard units and how many of the substandard units were found to be vacant. We have no idea of how many additional units it would be necessary to provide to replace the substandard dwellings.

Urgent need
for a Housing
Survey.

To decide the scale of any new housing scheme and to what extent public authority and private enterprise should compete in providing it, it is necessary first of all to know the dearth of available and satisfactory vacant units at rentals compatible with the people's income. It is very probable that a great number of the vacant dwelling units available at rentals of less than \$30. per month are unfit to live in. It is very probable also that a great number of people are forced to pay more than 20% of their income for rent.

Groups to
be Served

However it is clear that three classes must be recognized among those for whom dwellings may be required: 1.) Those who possess enough capital, or a sufficiently steady income, to be able to pay the price or rents which will enable private enterprise to meet their needs. 2.) Those whose position is less favourable, but who could afford the lower rents which would meet the bare annual charges and long term amortizations which would enable the Housing Commission to provide the dwellings without profit but without loss either. 3.) Those who, whether temporarily or permanently, do not earn enough to pay even the low rents of the second group, and who, if they are to live in an "adequate" dwelling must be subsidized in one form or another.

The present revival of the Toronto Housing Commission is the best evidence of a sense of duty to provide the necessary dwellings for the citizens of Toronto. Because of the war restrictions and the scarcity of some of the building materials not even the first group is able to receive dwelling accommodation at present without some form of temporary and public encouragement. It is obvious

also that the provision of houses for the second and third group cannot remain a temporary measure during the war-time alone, but it must become a permanent public service. Of course such housing service cannot be confined to provision of the bare shelter, it is necessarily bound up with problem of maintaining a minimum standard in housing and is a part of a much wider problem of social and economic organization.

Basis for
Public concern.

It has often been stated, and bears repeating, that private construction in Toronto has at no time more than scratched the surface of the housing market for the low-income groups. It has occasionally overbuilt in high and middle income field; but, whenever this has happened, the resulting vacancies did not benefit the low income groups, and will not benefit them even if the National Housing Act will be revived since the economic rentals were always beyond the reach of these families. Families with incomes of less than \$1800 do not have the cash for down payments, and are unable to meet the monthly payments necessary for legitimate profits and operation by private enterprise. What small reserves in cash they have must be saved for emergencies, such as sickness, lay-offs, etc. Most certainly these reserves cannot be used for the purchase of a home.

The result of this situation unfortunately is that the low-income groups are forced to live in unhealthy hovels and slums and blighted areas. (an area in which dwellings predominate that because of either dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, arrangements or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary factors or a combination of these factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants thereof). Since the outbreak of war these areas are increasing in a very dangerous way and they will soon create new social and economic problems for this city.

Houses or
Housing

It is a very popular assumption among the home builders that as soon as the National Housing Act will again enable them to build for sale \$3,500 bungalows spread over the city, the whole housing question and shortage will be solved. We are all concerned to build permanent housing for Toronto, but before we accept the assumption of home builders, we should ponder if the building of \$3,500 bungalows means real housing or only houses which will very soon become slums because lack of consideration of the whole matter in relationship to the city structure.

Bungalows for sale is not housing, but a dangerous solution.

To build again bungalows for sale on 30 feet lots in gridiron subdivisions is probably a greater mistake and a greater danger for the future development of the city, than building temporary structures of any sort, outside the city limits. Most of the cities in Europe and in U.S.A. have found that the process of building homes for one category of population only, has proved a failure; and then handing the dwellings down after successive stages of neglect and disrepair, to lower and lower income groups has proved a much greater failure. It neither eliminates the worst old slums nor prevents the erection of new slums.

What Housing really means.

In order to prevent slums a comprehensive program and well-planned housing projects are needed for the housing of all categories of citizens. In formulating this program, the welfare of human beings should be the first consideration and housing should serve to provide healthy homes and a humane manner of living for the people of Toronto at all income levels. It should also serve as a nucleus for living, working and recreation. Look at the map of Toronto. Imagine all the worst homes in the city cleared away. Imagine about half of the slum districts in downtown areas reconstructed in new well planned housing projects, with the remainder of the cleared space devoted to parks and new private buildings. Adjacent areas have taken on new life and rundown neighbourhoods are coming back. On the outskirts are a number of new neighbourhoods. Simple but neat, with well planned open spaces and houses with fresh and happy aspects. Look closer and you can see healthy children playing in wading pools and nursery schools and the adults in the parks and in the playgrounds. These neighbourhoods are planned in relation both to the people who are going to live there and to their accessibility to jobs, schools, and shopping.

It is evident now that such housing projects must be large enough to establish their own neighbourhood conditions, to resist being swallowed up by the surrounding blighted or industrial areas.

Housing and City Development

We should consider the future housing of Toronto in its social aspect intimately bound up with the development of the City, and the present immediate housing solution should become one section in a concerted plan. It would be a great mistake to freeze the present confused pattern.

It is far better to make definite proposal, sufficiently flexible so that future details can be properly adjusted. It is no longer a matter of not recognizing needs but rather of organizing material resources to meet these needs effectively.

The housing problem of Toronto at present is mainly to help remedy the shortage of homes for families of low income. There is also a likelihood that the already existing shortage of homes of low rent in the city will become very serious, if the housing of the war industry workers and their families will not be solved soon.

Emergency Solutions

The big problem now is what to do about it and who is to do it.

1. The first step to be taken is to relieve the City from the pressure of the war defence workers housing needs. This is an exclusive government task and can be solved only by the governmental power because of the selfish interest and resistance of the local authorities in the neighborhoods of the war factories. What is needed is close collaboration between the government agency, the Wartime Housing Limited and the municipal authority to plan, design and building in a way, that will satisfy the present needs and will be helpful in satisfying the future needs. Also. (see part I; "Temporary or Permanent Housing") 2.) The better distribution of the available dwelling accommodations and the preventative action to avoid the continuously increasing shortage is another way to ease but not to solve the definite problem inherited from the past.

The rationing, and conscription is a good example that there is a way in war time of a better distribution of vacant or not completely used dwellings.

The encouragement of increasing the number of dwellings by the better division of big dwellings into smaller units is a question of alteration of by-laws; and it will produce at least 100-150 dwellings in the middle income group.

- b:) A great help would be the temporary suspension of by-laws prohibiting rooming in certain section of the City.
- d:) The encouragement of rehabilitation at present of unfit dwellings by temporary exemption of taxes or by subsidies will create at least 200 dwellings for the lower income group.
- C:) The municipal government of the City of Toronto is empowered to act immediately in many other directions, also to produce new dwelling accommodations by converting existing buildings. (22-250 dwelling units could be probably obtained this way).

It is an indisputable fact that the only positive and satisfactory way to solve any housing question is to build the necessary type and number of dwelling units required by the natural increase or change of population. Here we get to the heart of the "housing problem." After careful examinations and studies made of the production by private enterprise of new homes at current prices, it is very easy to come to the following conclusion.

A: Production at present: because of the war restrictions, no increase in new dwellings in the range above \$5,000 can be awaited. The market price of the lowest category of home, which satisfies the requirements for the minimum standard of living is between \$3,000 and \$4,000, (including land and public service in the City limits). As mentioned above, only a small number of the low income class will be able to afford to buy it even with facilities offered the National Housing Act. The great illusion of building prosperity under the National Housing Act has a much different aspect if we consider that from 1936 until

The affect of the
National Housing Act
Loan in the past

December 1941 only 1,478 units for an amount of \$4,732,418 were built in the city of Toronto with the N.H.A. loan. It means the production of an average of 246 units yearly, when good materials were available and the quality of building was guaranteed by the builder.

The only positive
way is to build
FOR Rent, not for
Sale

It is obvious that the need of the low income class will not be satisfied by the revival of the N.H.A. The yearly need is approximately 2,000 units, but in the year of 1941 only 555 units were produced in Toronto, (of this the N.H.A. has been responsible for approximately 150 units. In the whole Toronto district, in 52 communities since 1936 September to 31st December 1941, in nearly six years only 5,886 units were built under the N.H.A. An average of 981 units yearly for an average price of \$3,200). What encouragement could

we expect from the N.H.A. in the years to come? It is not difficult to foresee that the building for sale of homes will not ease the needs under the N.H.A. for that income group which is really deprived of suitable living accommodations.

Public Housing

If enough new dwellings were built, even if they were occupied at first only by the higher income class, some gradual progress for all income groups of families would be at least theoretically possible.

But the majority of the wage earners will be excluded from decent homes. It seems a vicious circle, and so it has been. The answer is to be found, communities are now discovering, in public housing. Municipal schemes for slum clearance and re-housing, carefully mapped out and executed by a local housing authority, will inject new life into other industries as well as construction. No other form of industrial activity provides such vast opportunities for commercially sound, socially necessary enterprise as housing for the low wage earners, the masses of the population.

Recent studies have shown that municipalities are spending many times as much per capita excluding relief costs, in the slum areas than anywhere else. And every Mayor and council know full well that money and work and lives are wasted in a hopeless war against an ever increasing evil as long as the slums remain.

Cities cannot solve the housing problem alone

But the best building codes, the wisest zoning regulations, and the most ambitious municipal condemnation and demolition programs can never do more than scratch the surface of the slum problem, unless new homes are built.

Hampered by their limited taxing powers, their statutory debt limitations, and their inescapable obligations for other public services, the municipalities are powerless to finance public housing alone; without national aid.

National Housing in U.S.A.

In 1937 the Senate Committee on Housing in the United States submitted a report, that the Congress accepted and gave at once the authorization for a gigantic housing program; "The long range and carefully planned housing program will create jobs in private industry for a large percentage of men and women still idle and dependent upon public relief no matter how overwhelming their desire to earn a decent living in a normal way. And at a cost much cheaper than the terrible social and business toll of unhealthy housing in terms of disease, crime, and maladjustment - it will provide better living quarters for millions who now dwell in dismal and unsanitary surroundings."

Some months after the U.S.A. program got under way local communities eager to begin housing without delay, began to set up their authorities at the rate of 20 a month, under laws in 33 states enabling cities to take action. Within 10 months there were about 200 of these local agencies, and two thirds of them had received earmarked funds. New loan contracts signed soon rose to the fairly constant level of about \$50,000 a month.

What would a
Housing program
mean to Toronto

There are important evidences regarding shortage of houses, overcrowding, unsanitary and undesirable living conditions and slums revealed by previous housing surveys in Toronto.

Shortage of Houses. In 1934 the Lieutenant-Governor's Committee on housing conditions in Toronto reported that the city had 136,00 available for its 150,000 households, an apparent shortage of 14,000 dwelling units. But a potential shortage of 25,000, seemed likely if account were taken of deferred marriages, the return of many people to the city as economic conditions

improved, and the existence of many unsatisfactory and unsanitary dwellings which should be demolished.

Overcrowding

The pressure of this shortage falls upon the low-income groups and results in overcrowding and the occupation of unsatisfactory living quarters. A study of the Bureau of Statistics reveals that 15.48% of the households in Toronto have accommodation of less than one room per person. An intensive survey of 1,332 dwellings and 1,421 households revealed that 6.6% dwellings contained one or two extra families, 57% averaged more than one person per room, and 16% averaged two or more persons per room; 43 households of three persons lived in one room and 175 in one or two rooms.

In an intensive survey of all the dwellings in Moss Park and the Ward, it was found that 12.27% of dwellings of Moss Park and 3.04 of those of the Ward contained one or two extra families.

Insanitary and Unattractive living conditions

Overcrowding, of itself, would be enough, but the investigation of the surveys shows that overcrowding and insanitary and poorly equipped houses go hand in hand.

Of the 1,332 dwellings in Toronto covered by the extensive survey in 1934, 43% were without cellars, 28% in bad state of repair, 82% with no method of heating except stoves, 58% damp of which 20% were subject to flood, 9% without electricity, 40% with smells inside and out, 55% verminous, 59% without baths, 20% with outside toilets, and 20% without facilities for storage of food. Thirteen living or sleeping rooms were without windows. Of the total dwellings in Moss Park and the Ward, 1% and 4% respectively were without an opening upon a street or lane, 45% and 65% respectively had no method of heating except stoves, 9% and 16% respectively had outside toilets only and 27% and 44% respectively were without baths. Information on contemporary

(10)

conditions are by no means complete. We have however, the statements of some of the municipality authorities that since the Bruce Report conditions did not improve but are much worse.

What is the cost of substandard housing to the people who have to live in it and to the community as a whole?. How can we discover what effect bad housing has in terms of human welfare?

We can only find this out if we compare the standards of health and conduct in districts where bad housing prevails with the average standards of the community. When we do this, we are dealing with entire neighbourhoods and not just with individual houses. After all they cannot be separated. We know from studies that have been made in Europe and recently in the U.S.A. that sickness and death rates; the frequency of juvenile delinquency and crime are much higher among slum dwellers than other groups in the community. We also know that slums cost three to six times more for health, fire and police services than the average for the community as a whole. But to what extent these effects are due to housing is hard to say. Probably poverty is the greatest factor in producing the social effects of a slum district, just as it is the greatest factor in creating and maintaining slums.

People don't live in slums because they want to. They live there because they don't have enough money to pay for homes anywhere else, even if there were enough good houses in decent districts. Therefore any housing programme of Toronto must first contemplate the provision of housing for low rent and not housing for sale; that only a very limited number of the population can afford.

What to build and where?. Types of developments, location and design

It is assumed that the Dominion Government will provide the funds necessary to tackle the housing problem of Toronto. The question now is as to what to build and where?

In planning a housing project for low income families there are four types of houses which may be used. The choice should depend on the location and cost of land and the cost of utilities--that is, installing water supply and sewer systems, street paving and other services, There are:

a.) the one storey, detached single family dwelling bungalow. b.) the two storey, single family dwelling having it's living rooms below and bedrooms above, built singly or in attached groups generally two, four, or six. c.) the two storey flat dwelling (duplex) d.) the multi-storey tenement or apartment unit. Of these types, the single family, detached dwelling is probably appropriate only where land is cheap and large garden plots can be used. It is seldom the most economical in cost, while the second type, built semi-detached may sometimes be found to provide better accommodations for the lower cost. It has great advantages; it separates the sleeping accommodations on the upper floor and gives each family direct access to it's own plot of garden ground front and back. It is the general agreement that for family homes, where there are growing children it is the most satisfactory dwelling. European and lately U.S.A. experience has proved that where land is properly laid out for this type of building, economies in the street and utility costs can be made with comparatively low density.

The row house.

Multi-family apartments.

There are clearly a large proportion of tenants who prefer a flat dwelling. There are married people with no children where both are engaged the greater part of the day in other occupations than tending the house or the garden and to whom a flat dwelling, involving no responsibilities outside the main door, offers a very decided attraction. In selecting sites, in planning layouts and in designing buildings, a pleasing appearance, reasonable amenity in the surroundings and adequate community provisions according to the location and size of the project should be the prevailing factors.

Private and Public Enterprise:

The housing authority should take direct action only to provide housing for those families who cannot pay an economic rent for good privately produced housing. Private enterprise presumably will be the largest factor in the broad housing market and the authority should encourage it to develop sound and

economical procedures so as to serve as large a percentage of the population as possible.

Housing Authority

A housing authority must progress towards its objective by means of a series of equally important steps. It needs: 1.) a sound foundation of facts as recorded in a series of community surveys. The necessary basic studies fall into the following general groups, City structure and City Plan. Housing Standards. Substandard Housing areas, Housing needs and Market. 2.) It must then analyze the facts intelligently and from this analysis arrive at definite conclusions as to the action should take the proper housing of the citizens. 3. 0 These conclusions must be carried through to definite designs for new housing or the rehabilitation of existing housing. The problem is a continuing one and the housing authority must develop a long range program, that must be intelligently handled to gain public support.

Public demand

Social need must determine the direction and scope of this program. Public demand, expressed educationally and legislatively, will dictate the speed of its development. It has been said often that public opinion is like a great giant asleep. To-day it is different, it is no more asleep. The public opinion is really interested and vigilantly watches even such technical matters as whether projects should be on slum sites or vacant sites, what the new homes would rent for, what the costs would be, whether there should be apartments or one-family homes, what materials they should be made of and what equipment should be included, and whether or not there should be a nursery school or a wading pool. It also wants to understand the exact financial set-up and the form which national and local assistance would take.

The public needs housing, but the housing needs the public too.

When public sentiment favourable to the initiation and development of Toronto housing program has been aroused, then may we be certain that the housing movement has a chance to weld all kinds of citizens together into a unifying force against slums and in the favour of a decent standard of housing for all.

Report submitted to the Advisory Committee
Studying Housing in the City of Toronto.--

HOUSING PROBLEMS OF TORONTO

III PART

EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

AND

EMERGENCY ACTIONS

FOR THE

HOUSING CRISIS OF TORONTO

by

DR. E. G. FALUDI

Housing Problems of Toronto

III Part

Emergency Circumstances and Emergency Actions for the Housing Crisis of Toronto

by
Dr. E. G. Faludi

Oct. 24/42

It is indisputable that one of the vital problems of Toronto at present is to relieve the housing shortage and prevent its growth.

Need and Shortage: Because of the confusion of the terms created by various publications, there is a misunderstanding in interpretation of the proportion of the need and shortage. While the need refers to demand, the shortage refers to supply.

As to the proportion of the demand and need there are no exact figures available, because a scientific survey covering the whole city, has never been conducted. However, it is possible to deduce arbitrarily approximate figures with the help of - the census of monograph No. 8 "Housing in Canada" (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1931); the report of the LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS COMMITTEE 1934 and from recent reports of Municipality Authorities.

Need and Shortage:
continued

In determining the demands qualitatively and quantitatively, it is advisable to consider the whole matter of housing from a pessimistic point of view, because of lack of satisfactory replacement and supply in low cost and low rent housing in the last fifteen years; and because of continuous deterioration of existent resources.

What are the
Demands:

The demands could be divided into two groups,
i.e.:-

1. Direct consequence of the war and these are the demands for suitable housing:
 - (a) of the war industry workers and their families
 - (b) of soldiers families.
2. Indirect consequences of the war, because of lack of supply at present and insufficient supply in the past and shift in the economic conditions of certain categories of the population.
 - (a) demand of "merely" shelter for families on relief.
 - (b) demand for "sanitary" shelter for families with less than \$23 weekly income
 - (c) demand for "decent shelter" for families earning between \$24 and \$38 weekly income.
 - (d) demand for "comfortable shelter" for families earning between \$39 and \$60 weekly income.

A. Direct Consequences
of The War:

1. Dwelling units and individual rooms for
the war industry workers.

Extent of the demand: Because of the secrecy of defense problems exact and official figures are not at public disposal. However, it is estimated that there is a demand for 1600 units at present (Greater Toronto area). This figure is expected to grow in March, when an additional 7000 employees will be engaged in war industries. Considering that a great many of them will come from the Toronto area, it will probably evoke a demand for only 500 supplementary units and for 300 rooms. It is expected that the Government Agency W. H. Ltd. will take care of these demands.

2. Dwelling units for soldiers families

Extent of demand: There are four categories of demand:-

- (a) individual family houses
- (b) flats
- (c) apartments
- (d) rooms with cooking facilities.

Because of the social and economic conditions of these families, and because of the

absence of the head of the family, the greater portion of this demand is and will be for flats and apartments.

While official authorities estimate the total demand of this group for 600 units, it would be justifiable to consider that there is or will be in the near future a demand for at least 1000 units, because of the migratory tendency of these families (that is to move from the smaller towns and districts to the greater towns, such as Toronto) and because of the continuous increase of man power of the army.

This figure may be broken down as follows:

(a) Single houses in the category of \$16 or less monthly rent	175
(b) Single houses in the category of \$17 to \$32 monthly rent	225
(c) Flats	350
(d) Apartments	150
(e) rooms with cooking facilities	100
Total	1000 units

B. Indirect Consequences
Of The War

3. Dwelling Units for families on relief
("Merely Shelter")

Extent of Demand: There are three categories of demands:-

- (a) Single houses at the lowest rent possible
(under \$10 of monthly rent).
- (b) flats

- (c) apartments
- (d) rooms with cooking facilities.

These are the only groups for which exact figures can be quoted.

The Commissioner of Public Welfare recently submitted a report, estimating the total figure of 600 units. Because of the economic conditions of people on relief and because of the too high level of the rental market, the demands are mostly for flats and for rooms at the lowest possible rent. Of course this always leads to overcrowding and represents a permanent danger to the health conditions of the city.

The demands could be divided:-

(a) individual family houses	100
(b) flats	150
(c) apartments	150
(d) rooms with cooking facilities	200
Total	600 units

4. Dwelling units for families with less than \$25 weekly income. (Demand for merely sanitary shelter)

Extent of Demand:- There are three categories of demand:

- (a) single houses
- (b) flats
- (c) apartments

There are a great number of people in this category, who are compelled to leave their present dwellings, because:-

I. the house is sold, and the new owner will occupy it. The new owner usually had been living doubled up with another family, or came from another community.

II. Cost of living and taxes have risen while their income did not increase in the same ratio.

III. Families have dwindled as a result of the war. In 1931 the percentage of all households at progressive earning levels in Toronto was the following: (Census 1931 - Monograph No. 8. page 67 and 173)

<u>Income</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
\$0-399	7%
\$400-799	9%
\$800-1,199	<u>14%</u>
Total	30% of the 149,538 households of Toronto.

That is around 45,000 households. However since the conditions of many families in these income classes changed for the better, it is safe to assume that only 1% of them are in the above mentioned conditions (while the admissible vacancy index is 4%). This means that there is a demand for 450 "sanitary" units, in the category of under \$20 monthly rent, allowing 1/5 of the income for rent. The demand for 450 units may be divided:

(a) Single houses (single or semi-detached)	300
(b) flats	100
(c) apartments	30
Total	450

5. Dwelling units for families with \$24 to \$38 weekly income. (Demand for "decent" shelter)

Extent of Demand: There is demand mostly for individual family houses.

Reason: 1. The house is sold and new owner will occupy it. The new owner usually had been living doubled up, with another family, or came from another community.

2. Changing economic conditions. (up or down)

3. Changing family conditions;

Considering the paying capacity of this group, the monthly rent that it can afford varies between \$21 and \$30.

According to the statistics (census 1931, Monograph No. 8, page 73 -173) approximately 37% of 80,075 of total rented homes belong to this category, that is nearly 30,000.

It is admissible that 1% of them are in the above mentioned conditions (while the admissible vacancy index is 4%).

This means a demand for 300 "decent" units, broken up in:

(a) single houses	200
(b) flats	50
(c) apartments	50

6. Dwelling units for families with \$39 to \$60 weekly income (Demand for "comfortable" shelter)

It is wise to consider the demand of this group too.

In the inventory of available dwellings there will be a great number of houses suitable only for this group, because of the location and high rent, operating and

maintenance cost, and for monthly rent paying capacity between \$31 and \$48.

Total number of tenants in this group:-

Approximately 20% of 80,075 total rented homes (Census 1931 Monograph No. 8. page 73 and 173)

That is nearly 16,000.

It is admissible that a 1% (while the vacancy index is 4%) of them may have to leave their houses for reasons mentioned under No. 5. This means that there is a demand for 160 "comfortable" units.

Summary of demands:

A) Single House Income Groups	Temporary Housing W. H. Ltd.	PERMANENT HOUSING		
		Under \$20 Monthly Rent	Between \$21 and \$30 Monthly Rent	Between \$31 and \$48 Monthly Rent
1. War industry workers (Greater Toronto area)	2100			
2. Soldiers families		175	225	
3. Relief families		100		
4. Families in \$23 or less income group weekly		300		
5. Families between \$24 and \$38 weekly income			200	
6. Families of between \$39 and \$60 weekly income				160
Total demand for single houses	Temporary 2100	575 +	425 +	Permanent rent 160=1100

B) Flats Income Groups	\$20 or less monthly rent	Between \$21 and \$30 monthly rent	
2. Soldiers families	200		150
3. Relief families	150		
4. Families on \$23 or less weekly income	100		
5. Families between \$24 and \$38 income			50
Total demand for flats	450	+	200 650

C) Apartments

2. Soldiers families	150
3. Relief families	150

Summary of demands (continued)

C. Apartments (cont.)		\$20 or less monthly rent	Between \$21 and \$30 monthly rent
4. Families on \$23 or less weekly income		50	
5. Families between \$24 and \$38 weekly income			50
Total demand for Apartments		350	50

D. Rooms		Monthly Rent under \$10	Monthly Rent above \$10
1. War Workers		150	150
2. Soldiers families		50	50
3. Relief families		200	
Total demand for rooms		400	200

Summary of all demands

		PERMANENT HOUSING					Total Permanent
	Temporary	Under \$10	Above \$10	Rent Under \$20	Rent \$21 \$30	Rent \$31 \$48	
A. Single houses	2100			575	425	160	1160
B. Flats				450	200		650
C. Apartments				350	50		400
D. Rooms		400	200				600
Total No. of Units	2100 X	400	200	1375	675	160	2810

(The demand for 2100 temporary units is for the greater Toronto area.)

Definition of the
Needs:

While these demands are evoked principally by the present and unusual circumstances, the needs are mostly inherited from the pre-war conditions which have become worse during wartime and their continuance is now a menace to public health, and security. Of course if the demands are not satisfied as they grow, they will lead to the same consequences.

The Bruce report determined the need qualitatively and quantitatively in the following conclusion:-

The number of dwellings constituting a definite menace to health and decency is not less than 2,000 and may be more than 3,000.

Since 1934, when the report was prepared no improvements have been made on housing conditions of the city. The situation is undoubtedly worse today.

Demands and Needs: In the valuation of the demands and needs, it is worthwhile to mention that, while the demands are psychological, the needs are physical, but there is no difference between their destructive effects.

In the determination of the housing shortage it is necessary to consider both the demands and needs. In the gigantic task of relieving and preventing the shortage, a program of objectives should be prepared in which the demands must be dealt with first without delay, using all the available resources.

Definition of the Shortage: The difference between the amount of demand plus need, and available stock constructed or under construction is the real shortage.

Availabilities: In the Mayor's report of October 21st, 1942 the estimates of what might be made available under certain conditions, are the following:

SINGLE HOUSES

Ready for immediate <u>occupancy:</u>	(a) Vacant premises standing idle but offered for sale (single houses)	250	
	(b) Housing units still available on Toronto Island (single houses)	50	
Ready for occupancy before the end of <u>the year:</u>	(c) Dwelling units estimated to be constructed from present to the end of the year in Toronto area (single houses)	300	
	(d) Wartime houses on Mugg's Island (single houses)	50	
Ready for occupancy <u>in 4 months:</u>	Total		650

B. FLATS OR APARTMENTS

Available in the next <u>two months:</u>	1. Conversion of stores into dwellings	250	
	2. Housing units to be made available as a result of war time housing under construction to be completed in eight weeks	290	

Available in the near <u>future:</u>	3. Additional housing units ready by Feb.	100	
	4. Conversion of large dwellings into multiple units as a result of relaxation of restrictions.	400	

Total

1040
1690

Assuming that the municipal authorities will be able to dispose of these units in time and in quantity the situation is the following:-

	<u>Demands</u>	<u>Availables</u>	<u>Emergency Shortage</u>
Temporary houses (government task) (W. H. Ltd.)	2100	2100	
PERMANENT HOUSING			
a) Single houses	1160	650	510
b) Flats and Apts.	1050	1040	10
Total Permanent	2210	1690	

Financial help to care for the Emergency Shortage:

The great question is now how to impliment the various proposals, so as to make available to the various income groups, what they ask for and what they can afford. It is also very probable that the public authorities will have to help with financial aid, if the rent of the available unit is higher than people can afford to pay.

Real Shortage:

At the end of February 1943, when all the stock will be exhausted there will be a real shortage, because there will not be left any vacant houses. The consequences of this are not difficult to forecast.

The lower income class will overcrowd the already crowded areas and the physically unfit houses, that were condemned 8 years^{ago} by the Bruce Committee.

It is not necessary to describe what this means in case of epidemics, such as followed the last Great War.

Analysis of the Real Shortage:

After February 1943 the real shortage will be the following:-

1. Emergency shortage as mentioned approximately 520 units,
2. Single houses, flats and apartments, for the lowest income class to relieve overcrowding in crowded areas and prevent overcrowding in other areas.

According to the 1931 census there are:-

488 households paying under \$10 monthly rentals

4565 households paying \$10-\$15 monthly rental

Total 5053 units. (Census Monograph No. 8, page 163)

The Bruce report considered not less than 2000 of them "a definite menace to health and decency" early in 1934. It is very obvious that not even the improvements made under the Home Improvement Loan could prolong their fitness for living accommodation for more than 5-8 years. And now we are at the end of this term.

It is justifiable to assume that at least half of them must be condemned as rental objects.

This will create a shortage of 1000 units. Of course the total replacement of all the slums and the replacement of all the obsolete houses will be the ideal solution, but this is a subject to deal with from a social point of view and should be a post-war task. (It is a problem of building at least 30,000 units.)

After February next there will be no vacancy at all:

3. Because of the exhaustion of all the housing reserves for satisfying the immediate demands, after February next, the City of Toronto will be without any vacancies at all. This means that it will be

practically impossible to change any housing accommodation.

The result of this can be only a blackmarket with prohibitive prices, from which the low and middle income classes will be excluded.

(x census 1931)

Accepting the principle of 4% vacancy, to allow for the normal shifting of population, we should be satisfied in wartime with 1%. Considering 80,075 x tenant households, it means a shortage of 800 units.

Summary of Real Housing Shortage after February 1943.

1. Emergency shortage	520 units
2. For prevention of overcrowding	1000 units
3. Vacancy	800 units
Total real shortage	2320 units

It is obvious that even the supply of the 2320 units in 1943 will not prevent a further shortage from developing, if the war conditions make it impossible to supply new housing accommodations.

Control of Distribution of available housing and restriction of immigration to the City:

Because of the very limited supply during war time it seems that a control of the distribution of available housing, will be needed such as is exercised over other vital goods and supplies, and a restriction of immigration to the City of families not related to the war effort.

Recommendations:
Supply of units of
\$30 - \$60 monthly
rent

- 1.) Building restrictions could be temporarily lifted and priorities in building materials granted to private enterprise if they would build a limited number of dwellings for rent only and not for sale. This would take care of the shortage of all classes who could pay a rent between \$30 and \$60.
- 2.) The supply of housing during wartime for the lower income classes (because of lack of necessary legislation and funds for emergency public housing) must be taken over by a Government Agency under similar Act as War Time Housing. I recognize the difficulty of setting up a new Government Agency, but I recommend it, because I cannot see how the W. H. Ltd. can undertake it with an organization experience and character for purely temporary housing, and according to Press Reports, that Company is burdened with overheads that are justifiable for emergency temporary housing, but prohibitive for permanent housing.

Wartime Housing was set up to provide "houses" at a lowest price possible and with the greatest speed, where as permanent "Housing" (as distinct from mere "Houses") involves the consideration of social problems, broader planning in addition to a close study of economy and finance.

Planning Body for
Housing:

- 3.) To assure a permanent value and a social content for it, it will be necessary to take the planning procedure out of this Agency's hands and place it under the authority of a proper planning body. Such a body could make use of existent legislation and ^{Federal} Government aid to design and locate the best housing scheme that circumstances permit.
- 4.) The failure of the attempt of the authorities of the City of Hamilton in an identical problem is a good example and a good indication, that the Provincial authorities will not allow any housing adventure to be undertaken where operating losses are foreseen.

Supply possibilities and methods to prevent the growing housing shortage for non-war workers families.

While the solution of the acute housing shortage and problems inherited from the past is one of the great fields for post-war employment, the prevention of the growing shortage is a task of the present.

Only Permanent
Housing:

It is indisputable that any housing undertaken at present must be permanent housing, because temporary housing will only extend the post-war housing problem.

Housing for all
Income Classes:

The figures of demands reveal that the shortage is general and not limited only to the lowest income class.

Low rent Housing
without loss?

The question remains open if it is possible to plan, design, build, and operate a large scale permanent housing scheme for the lowest income class without operating losses.

There is no doubt that liabilities cannot be avoided in public housing for the lowest income class, otherwise private enterprise would solve the whole question and in very short time.

It is easy to demonstrate that temporary housing built by the War Time Housing means a loss of at least 60% of all investments at the moment it is erected, and further losses in operating it. In the case of permanent housing the total investments are a little higher but all the losses are radically reduced.

Because of the emergency character of this problem, and because of its effect on the war effort and its dangerous consequences in case it is not solved, the Municipality Authorities must convince ^{Federal} the/Governmental and Provincial Authorities that the finding of the necessary legal and economical means of a solution cannot be delayed any longer.

Conclusions:

1. There is a demand for 2210 dwelling units in all categories of rental groups. (approximately)
2. The Mayor's report indicates 1690 available units ready for occupancy not later than February 1943.
3. There is an emergency shortage of 520 units.
4. After February 1943 there will be a real shortage of 2320 units caused directly and indirectly by the war and to be dealt with during the war.
5. There is an acute shortage of at least 30,000 units to deal with after the war.

Recommendations:

1. Controlled distribution of all available housing, until the growth of the shortage will be halted.
2. Restriction of immigration to the city of families not related to the war efforts.
3. Only permanent housing should be built for families not related to war industries.
4. Private enterprise should be encouraged in building rental housing (for all classes, who could pay a rent between \$30 and \$60), by temporarily lifting of building restrictions and granting priorities for a limited period.
5. The appointment of a planning body for low rent public housing.
6. The provision of emergency low rent public housing should be taken over by a Government Agency, under similar Act or legislation as War Time Housing Limited.
7. Because of the emergency character of the housing problem of Toronto, Municipality Authorities must convince

Federal Governmental and Provincial Authorities to
agree in legislative and financial means to build in
1943 2,000 units for the low income class of Toronto.

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